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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the same forums and under the same substantive law. The West-
inghouse case prevents that and in this respect is in conflict with
the national policy of uniformity in the regulation of labor rela-
tions. It has been suggested that this case will be overruled if
the issue is presented again.3 3 This position would seem to be
supported somewhat by the result in the Enterprise case; for it
would seem that the union's interest would be satisfied if the
employer is compelled to arbitrate and that the enforcement of
the award would fall more nearly into the category of uniquely
personal rights. Consequently, the Court's allowing the union to
enforce the arbitrator's award would seem to suggest that a
retreat from Westinghouse is occurring, although there was no
discussion of this in the Enterprise case and although the West-
inghouse case was not overruled.
It is submitted that the most expeditious remedy would be a
legislative overruling of Westinghouse by amending Section 301
so that any right which arises from a collective bargaining con-
tract may be enforced in the federal courts. Such a course would
eliminate the anomaly that exists today because of the Westing-
house decision and would result in all rights in a collective bar-
gaining contract being governed by the same substantive law.
Peyton Moore
Recovery of Stolen Paper Money Under the
Louisiana Civil Code and the Negotiable
Instruments Law
Article 21381 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that if a
debtor give a thing in payment of his obligation, which he has
no right to deliver, his obligation is not discharged and the
owner may recover his goods, unless the obligation has been
discharged by the payment of money or things which are con-
sumed in use, and the creditor has used them; in which case
33. Isaacson, The Implication8 of the Recent Supreme Court Decisions on
Labor Arbitration, 13 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 67 (1958).
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2138 (1870) : "If the debtor give a thing in payment
of his obligation, which he has no right to deliver, it does not discharge his obliga-
tion, and the owner of the thing given may reclaim it in the hands of the creditor,
unless the obligation has been discharged by the payment of money, or the delivery
of some of those things which are consumed in the use, and the creditor has used
them; in which cases neither the money nor the things consumed can be reclaimed,
and the payment will be good."
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neither can be reclaimed and the payment is good. Article 21392
provides that the owner of money or other stolen property, which
has been given in payment, may recover the stolen article and
the payment by the thief is not good.
In a recent case a Louisiana court of appeal declared that
when stolen money is given by the thief in payment of a pre-
existing debt the owner may recover the amount paid to the
creditor A In so holding, the court declared that Article 2138
applies generally to money or things given in payment which
the debtor has no right to deliver, and that Article 2139 qualifies
and is not in conflict therewith, applying specifically to cases
involving stolen money. Furthermore, the court declared that
the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law did not repeal
Article 2139 since money is not signed by the maker and there-
fore is not a negotiable instrument. On rehearing, the court re-
affirmed its original interpretation of the Civil Code articles
and, on the NIL point, stated that currency and silver cer-
tificates do not "come within the purview of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, possibly not for the reasons stated in our
original opinion but for the reason that such are not commercial
paper which this law is designed to cover. ' 4
The purpose of this Comment is three-fold: first, to compare
similar problems and their solutions in other systems of law;
second, to examine the Louisiana jurisprudence and pertinent
Civil Code articles; and third, to examine briefly the relation of
the NIL to the problem of stolen paper money used to pay a
pre-existing debt.
For the purpose of this Comment, currency is defined as
encompassing all forms of legal tender. It includes both paper
money as well as metallic money or coin. Paper money refers
to silver certificates and Federal Reserve notes commonly re-
ferred to as "greenbacks." 5
THE COMMON LAW
Bona Fide Purchaser of Goods
The general rule at common law is that a third party who
2. Id. art. 2139: "If money, or other stolen property, be given in payment,
the payment is not good, and the owner may recover the amount paid."
3. Crawford v. Alatex Construction Service, Inc., 120 So.2d 845 (La. App.
1960).
4. Id. at 853.
5. For different forms of legal tender, see 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 452-463 (1954).
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purchases goods from a vendor having legal or equitable title
will prevail over the original owner of the goods, provided the
third purchaser has given value for the goods and is in good
faith.6 The vendor is counted as having a legal or equitable title
even though he has obtained a movable through fraud7 or vice
of consent.8 In this case, he has a voidable title which, upon
transfer to the bona fide purchaser, becomes good.
However, when the bona fide purchaser obtains the article
from a person who possesses no title or is without authority to
sell, the original owner can recover the goods.9 The vendor will
have no title and no authority to sell in the following situations:
(1) sale by a bailee or custodian;' 0 (2) sale by a finder;" and
(3) sale by one who has obtained the goods tortiously or feloni-
ously.12
In the situation where a third party purchases goods from
a vendor having legal or equitable title, the requirement that
the purchase have been for value in order for the bona fide
purchaser to prevail over the original owner has presented some
difficulty.' 3 Thus, where the third party purchaser takes goods
in payment of an antecedent debt, opinion is somewhat divided
as to whether the value requirement has been met. Originally,
6. Snyder v. Lincoln, 153 Neb. 611, 45 N.W.2d 749 (1951) ; Kibler v. Yakima
Finance Corp., 144 Wash. 604, 258 Pac. 490 (1927); Barthelmess v. Cavalier,
2 Cal. App.2d 477, 38 P.2d 484 (1934) ; Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of
Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV.
589, 594 (1932); 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 288, 293-294 (1952) ; 92 C.J.S. Vendor d
Purchaser § 320 (1955).
7. Baehr v. Clark, 83 Iowa 313, 49 N.W. 840 (1891). At common law, in
determining whether one who obtains a movable by fraud receives a voidable
title or rather receives no title at all, a distinction is drawn in transactions which
are inter presentes and those which are inter absentes. In the former the de-
frauder obtains voidable title, whereas in the latter he obtains no title. 3 CouwNi,
CONTRACTS § 602 (1951).
8. Richmond v. Mississippi Mills, 52 Ark. 30, 11 S.W. 960 (1889) ; Callendar
Savings Bank v. Loos, 142 Iowa 1, 120 N.W. 317 (1909) ; Cardone v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Mun. Ct. 1949).
9. Simpson v. Shaw, 51 Ariz. 293, 226 P.2d 557 (1951) ; Yates v. Russell,
20 Ariz. 338, 180 Pac. 910 (1919) ; Voss v. Chamberlain, 139 Iowa 569, 117 N.W.
269 (1908) ; Blue Grass Taxi Garage Co. v. Shepherd, 304 Ky. 390, 200 S.W.2d
936 (1941) Plummer v. Kingsley, 190 Ore. 378, 226 P.2d 297 (1951) ; Notes, 25
TUL. L. REV. 146 (1950), 23 TUL. L. REV. 420 (1949); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 295
(1955).
10. Goddard Grocer Co. v. Freedman, 127 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. App. 1939)
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Baker, 291 N.Y.S. 1015, 161 Misc. 238
(1936).
11. Stoltz v. Miltenberger, 176 Ind. 561, 96 N.E. 581 (1911) ; 77 C.J.S.
Sales § 295(d) (1955).
12. Goddard Grocer Co. v. Freedman, 127 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. App. 1939)
Effron v. Haile, 103 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1951).
13. See VOLD, LAW OF SALES 403 (1959) ; 55 AM. Juu. Vendor d Purchaser
§ 742 (1941) ; 77 C.J.S. Sales § 290 (1955).
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the overwhelming majority at common law denied protection
to the third party against the original owner, refusing to count
the cancellation of a pre-existing debt as a giving of value.
14
This position was supported upon the reasoning that by allowing
the owner to reclaim his goods and by reinstating the creditor's
claim against the debtor, the parties would be restored to their
original positions. It would seem, however, that such a conclu-
sion is not always justifiable, since often the creditor cannot be
restored to his original position. In many cases the creditor
might have lost an opportunity to collect, the debtor may have
concealed his assets, or the creditor may have cancelled a lien
or mortgage against the debtor's property.' Since the enact-
ment of the NIL and the Uniform Sales Act, which do consider
a pre-existing debt as value,' there has been greater movement
in the direction of affording protection to the creditor who re-
ceives goods in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt. Although it
is still a minority view, some courts have considered the creditor
in this situation as a bona fide purchaser for value.17
Bona Fide Acquirer of Currency
Where a bona fide third party acquires currency, or nego-
tiable instruments from one who has no title, the common law
reaches a result diametrically opposed to that reached in the
case of chattels acquired by a third party. Although the acquirer
of chattels is not protected against the original owner in such
a situation, 8 the acquirer of currency or negotiable instruments
is.19 This protection, however, is limited to those cases where
the currency passes aw currency2 as opposed to the sale of rare
14. See note 12 supra.
15. In cases in which the creditor has changed his position to his detriment,
!o that he cannot be restored to his original position, more of the common law
jurisdictions, although still in the minority, have tended to consider him as being
a bona fide purchaser for value and afforded protection, distinguishing those
cases in which he has not changed position. E.g., McCleery v. Wakefield, 76 Iowa
529, 41 N.W. 210 (1889) ; Farmers & M. State Bank v. Higgins, 149 Kan. 783,
89 P.2d 916 (1939) ; Grand Rapids National Bank v. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 107
N.W. 76 (1906).
16. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 25; UNIFORM SALES ACT
§ 76.
17. Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 114 Pac. 490 (1911); Sutton v. Ford,
144 Ga. 587, 87 S.E. 799 (1916) ; Rasmussen v. 0. E. Lee & Co., 104 Mont. 278,
66 P.2d 119 (1937). See VOLD, LAW OF SALES 403 (1959).
18. See note 8 supra.
19. People's National Bank v. Jones, 249 Ky. 468, 61 S.W.2d 17 (1933)
Salley v. Terrill, 95 Me. 553, 50 Atl. 896 (1901) ; Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452
(1758). See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 339-43 (1943); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 292
(1955) ; 8 AM. JurL Bills d Notes § 619 (1937).
20. In the early English case of Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 457 (1758), the
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coins as collector's items.2 1 It is from this English jurisprudence
relative to coin and bank notes that the law merchant and, sub-
sequently, the Negotiable Instrument Law was derived.
Summary
The common law rules relative to a bona fide purchaser may
be summarized thusly: (1) a bona fide purchaser of goods from
one who has legal or equitable title is protected against the
original owner if he gives value, but a majority of the, common
law still holds that an antecedent debt does not constitute value;
(2) a bona fide purchaser of goods from one who has no title
cannot prevail against the owner; and (3) a bona fide purchaser
of currency, passing as currency, is successful against the owner
whether his vendor had title or not.
THE FRENCH LAW
Generally: Goods or Money
The civilian counterpart of the bona fide purchaser doctrine
is the doctrine of la possession vaut titre which protects one
dealing with the possessor of corporeal movables. 22 The doctrine
as stated in the French Civil Code means in effect that in the
case of movables, possession is equivalent to title.2 3 La posses-
sion vaut titre was created to protect third parties who had
received a movable from one to whom it had been confided.2 4
court stated: "It has been quaintly said, 'that the reason why money cannot be
followed is, because it has no earmark:' but this is not true. The true reason is,
upon account of the currency of it: it cannot be recovered after it has passed in
currency. So, in case of money stolen, the true owner cannot recover it, after it
has been paid away fairly and honestly upon a valuable bona fide consideration."
21. United States v. Barnard, 72 F. Supp. 531 (W. D. Tenn. 1947) ; Chapman
v. Cole, 12 Gray 141, 171 Am. Dec. 739 (1858) ; Moss v. Hancock, 2 Q.B. 111
(1899).
22. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2476 (1959); Franklin, Security of
Acquisition and of Transaction: La PossCssion Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Pur-
chase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 595, 598 (1932); Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 420, 422
(1949).
23. FaENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2279 (Wright's transl. 1906) : "With reference
to movables, possession is considered equivalent to a title. But a person who has
lost or who has been robbed of something can bring an action to recover it against
any person he finds in possession thereof within three years of the date of the
loss or robbery, and the latter has his right of action over against the person from
whom he received it."
24. See 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2476 (1959).
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Unlike the common law doctrine of bona fide purchaser, this
theory, in general, protects the good faith acquirer of a chattel
rather than the original owner. 25 In setting forth the distinc-
tion between the bona fide purchaser doctrine of common law
and the doctrine of la possession vcut titre, it has been said that
the common law doctrine terminates only technical equities in
the original owner, while the doctrine of la possession vaut titre
terminates any interest, except that of an owner of goods which
were lost or stolen. 26
Lost or Stolen Goods
Article 2279 of the French Civil Code setting forth the doc-
trine of la possession vaut titre excepts from its operation goods
which have been lost or stolen. Consequently, the owner of such
goods may prevail over the third party who has acquired them.2 7
In the case of lost or stolen goods, the French provide that the
action for the revendication of the property must be brought
against an innocent party within three years from the date upon
which the goods were lost or stolen.28 If, however, the goods
remain in the possession of the thief or finder, the owner has
thirty years in which to bring the action.2 A modification of
this rule occurs where the action is brought to recover lost or
stolen goods from one who bought them at a fair, market, or
public sale or from a merchant ordinarily dealing in such ar-
ticles. In such cases, the French Code provides that the owner
cannot demand the return of the goods except on reimbursing
the third party the price he paid for the goods.30
25. See Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 601 (1932).
26. See 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2482 (1959) ; Franklin, Security of
Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Pur-
chase, 6 TUL. L.REv. 589, 601 (1932).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. It would seem that the French allow the vendee to be reimbursed to the
extent of the purchase price paid without the necessity of possessing the goods
for any specific period. The vendee would be entitled to reimbursement im-
mediately without the requirement of possessing for three years as in Louisiana.
See 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION RY TLE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2483-2486 (1959).
29. Id. nos. 2483, 2484.
30. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2280 (Wright's transl. 1908) "If the person
in actual possession of the thing stolen or lost bought it at a fair or market or at
a public sale, or from a merchant selling similiar articles, then the original owner
cannot demand possession thereof except on condition of paying the person in
possession the price he paid for it. A lessor who seeks to recover under Art. 2102
movables taken away without his consent, and which were bought under the
circumstances mentioned above, must also repay the buyer the price he paid."
1961]
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Stolen Currency
The French commentators seem to be somewhat in conflict
in resolving the problem raised by an acquirer in good faith of
stolen currency. Pothier states that where a payment is made in
currency, by a person who is not the owner, the true owner
may not recover the currency and the payment is valid if the
money has been "consumed" by the creditor.3 ' Pothier contends
that it is the consumption which puts the money out of the
creditor's possession, that marks the time at which the owner
may no longer reclaim the stolen money. 32 Planiol considers in
more detail the specific problems presented by movables which
have been lost or stolen 33 and concludes that the French, like
the common law, never allowed the revendication for the re-
covery of coin.3 4 This protection is also afforded the third party
possessor of bank notes and currency. 5
THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
Louisiana has expressly rejected the French theory of la pos-
session vaut titre in favor of the bona fide purchaser doctrine. 86
Consequently, the acquirer of goods from one who has no title is
not protected in Louisiana to the extent that he is in France.
It has been suggested that the reason for this choice lies in the
fact that during the development of the law in this area, Lou-
isiana was primarily an agrarian society. In such a society, the
need for security of one's ownership in goods was considered
paramount. On the contrary, the French society was more ad-
vanced and the need for security of transactions in movables,
without the danger of possible nullification by pre-existing
equities, was paramount.3 7
31. 1 POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS OR CONTRACTS, no.
461 (Evans transl. 1853).
32. Ibid.
33. See 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2492-2494 (1959); 2 id. no. 406.
34. See 1 id. nos. 2488-2492; Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Trans-
action: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TuL. L. REV. 589,
598 (1932).
35. See 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2492 (1959) ; 2 id. nos. 401-406.
36. Holton v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715, 22 So. 338 (1897) ; Holloway v.
Ingersoll Co., 133 So. 819 (La. App. 1931).
37. -See Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession
Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589, 601 (1932).
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Chattels in Payment of Antecedent Debt
Civil Code Article 2138 provides that where a debtor gives a
thing, which he has no right to deliver, in payment of his obliga-
tion, the owner may recover the goods from the creditor unless
the thing has been used or consumed. Presumably the language
of the article "which he has no right to deliver" is broad enough
to include the debtor who possesses by virtue of either a void
or voidable title. 8  However, in regard to chattels obtained from
a possessor who holds under a voidable title, Louisiana courts
have adopted the solution of the common law and afforded pro-
tection to the purchaser in good faith and for value . 9 Although
it might be argued that the draftsmen of the Code intended the
three-year prescription to be the sole measure of protection to
be afforded to the good faith purchaser, 40 it is clear that the
common law solution has been adopted.
Stolen Chattels or Currency Given in Payment of
Antecedent Debt
Although Article 2138 sets forth the general rule applicable
to goods transferred in satisfaction of an obligation by the
debtor who held under either a void or voidable title, this article
must be construed with Article 2139, which limits the applica-
tion of Article 2138 in the area of stolen currency or goods given
in payment. Article 2139 provides that the owner of stolen cur-
rency or goods may recover them from the creditor who has
received them in payment of an obligation. As to goods which
are held by one who has no title (lost or stolen goods) and
which have passed into the hands of a good faith acquirer, the
Civil Code in Article 3509 provides that all movables may be
acquired by the prescription of ten years.41 Although an owner
38. The Code article, in using the language "that which he has no right to
deliver" presumably includes all degrees of stealing as contemplated by the com-
mon law. In the case of larceny and embezzlement, the thief gets no title, but in
the case of false pretenses the thief is generally held to have voidable title. This
distinction has been followed in Louisiana. Packard Florida Motors Co. v. Malone,
208 La. 1058, 24 So.2d 75 (1945) (larceny) ; Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell,
167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1929) (embezzlement) ; Lynn v. Lafitte, 177 So. 83(La. App. 1937) (larceny).
39. Thomas v. Mead, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 341 (La. 1829); Note, 17 LouISIANA
LAW REVIEW 854 (1957).
40. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 3506 (1870) provides that if a person has possessed
a movable in good faith and by a just title, for a period of three years, he acquires
the ownership of the movable unless it was a thing which was lost or stolen.
41. Id. art. 3509: "When the possessor or any movable whatever has possessed
it for ten years without interruption, he shall acquire the ownership of it without
being obliged to produce a title or to prove that he did not act in bad faith."
See Note, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 854 (1957).
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may recover lost or stolen goods prior to the expiration of the
prescriptive period of ten years, the jurisprudence has inter-
preted Civil Code Articles 3506 and 350742 to mean that where
the purchaser has acquired the stolen goods at public auction
or from one in the habit of selling such things, he is entitled to
a restitution of the price if he has possessed the goods for a
period of three years. 43
Since the French Civil Code contains no article which cor-
responds to Article 2139, the French authorities are of no aid
in interpretation. A possible explanation of the presence of this
article may be found in the fact that, at the time of its enact-
ment, the common law was overwhelmingly to the effect that
a pre-existing debt was not sufficient to constitute a giving of
value as required by the bona fide purchaser doctrine, 44 and
therefore allowed the owner to recover his goods. The refusal
to protect the creditor, who had received stolen currency, under
Article 2139 possibly reflects the common law thinking at this
time. It is to be noted, however, that the trend of the statutory
law today seems to be toward holding such to constitute value."
It appears that only twice have the Louisiana appellate courts
faced the question of recovery of stolen paper money transferred
by one having no title.46 However, in neither case was the paper
42. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3507 (1870) : "If however, the possessor of a thing
stolen or lost bought it at a public auction or from a person in the habit of selling
such things, the owner of the thing can not obtain restitution of it, without re-
turning to the purchaser the price it cost him."
43. Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1929) ; Campbell
v. Nichols, 11 Rob. 16 (La. 1845) ; Davis v. Hampton, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 288 (La.
1826).
44. See VOLD, LAW OF SALEs 403 (1959) ; 55 AM. JuR. Vendor t Purchaser§ 742 (1941); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 290 (1955).
45. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 76; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(44); 46
AM. JR. Sales § 467 (1941) ; 77 C.J.S. Sales § 290 (1955).
46. In the case of First National Bank of Birmingham, Ala. v. Gibert & Clay,
123 La. 845, 49 So. 593 (1909), the court denied recovery of paper money used
by a bank teller in speculating on the stock market. The court quoted language
of an Illinois case which was almost identical to the instant case and followed
the established doctrine of the common law relative to stolen paper money in deny-
ing recovery. The case of Steamboat Carrie Converse & Owners v. Jacob Feitig,
27 La. Ann. 117 (1875), which was tried prior to the enactment of the NIL in
Louisiana, also denied recovery. In this case the plaintiff sought to recover paper
money in the possession of a gambler. The gambler had acquired possession of
the paper money from the plaintiff's employee who had embezzled it from the
plaintiff. The Court stated that this was not a case in which the plaintiff was
seeking to recover a specific piece of property which was in possession of defend-
ant and dismissed the petition as showing no cause of action. By the court's
language, it would seem that it was applying the bona fide purchaser doctrine
and that had the plaintiff been suing for the recovery of property he would have
been successful, for under the bona fide purchaser doctrine an embezzler obtains
no title and can pass none. However, in the case of stolen paper money (which
includes embezzlement and larceny) the common law denied recovery.
[Vol. XX1
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money used to pay a pre-existing debt as contemplated in Article
2139. Thus, it appears that Article 2139 has played no part in
prior reported decisions and was not urged or considered in the
two cases which might possibly have presented an opportunity
for its consideration.
PAPER MONEY AS A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT AT COMMON LAW
In order to determine whether money is a negotiable instru-
ment within the purview of the NIL, a consideration of the
history and purpose of the NIL is necessary. At an early date
in England metallic coin passed from hand to hand free of prior
equities because of its own special nature.4 7 Bank notes were
negotiable and apparently passed free from equities sixty years
before the doctrine of transferability free from equities was
judicially established in 1758.48 In that decision, it is evident
that bank notes were intended as a substitute for paper money,
since they were given all the attributes of paper money, i.e., its
currency and transferability free from equities.49 By the close
of the eighteenth century, the English courts had established
the basic principles of the law of negotiable instruments. This
body of law was known as the law merchant and it was but a
short step to its codification and acceptance in 1882 in England
in the Bills of Exchange Act.50 In the United States this Eng-
lish act served as the basis for the acts adopted by the several
states around the turn of the century. 51 Louisiana adopted the
NIL in 1904.52
Under the NIL the attributes of negotiability appear to be
fairly well settled. To be negotiable, an instrument must (1)
be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer; (2) contain
an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
47. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 10, 14 (1943).
48. Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452 (1758).
49. In the Miller case, when it was contended that bank notes were mere
chattels, the court said: "But the whole fallacy of the argument turns upon the
comparing bank notes to what they do not resemble, and what they ought not to
be compared to, viz. to goods or to securities, or documents for debts. Now they
are not goods, not securities, nor documents for debts, nor are so esteemed: but
are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course and transaction of business,
by the general consent of mankind; which gives them the credit and currency of
money, to all intents and purposes. They are as much money, as guineas them-
selves are; or any other current coin, that is used in common payments as money
or cash." Id. at 457.
50. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 14-22 (1943) ; 7 Am. JuR. Bills & Notes
§ 22 (1937).
51. See note 49 supra.
52. La. Acts 1904, No. 64.
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money; (3) be payable on demand; and (4) be payable to bearer
or to order.5 3 It would seem that paper money, i.e., silver cer-
tificates of the United States Treasury and Federal Reserve
bank notes, meets all the requisites of negotiability. Each such
instrument contains a promise to pay to the bearer thereof, on
demand, a sum certain in silver dollars. The issuance of paper
money by the Federal Government is not an attempt to coin
money out of valueless material, but it is rather a pledge of
the national credit and constitutes a promise by the government
to pay in silver dollars the amount represented by the cer-
tificate.54 A California appellate court, in resolving the owner-
ship of stolen fifty dollar bills, applied the provisions of the NIL
and stated that United States treasury notes are negotiable in-
struments of the highest character. 5 As to the requirement that
it must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer,
Britton, in his Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes,56 states
that the "signature may be in one's handwriting, or printed,
engraved, lithographed or photographed so long as they are
adopted as the signatures of the signers. ' '57
It should be noted that in considering whether paper money
is a negotiable instrument within the purview of the NIL at
common law, little aid is derived from the jurisprudence because
the common law is not faced with the necessity of making such
a determination, since the owner is denied recovery under either
the common law or the NIL. However, it would seem to this
writer that at common law, paper money is considered a nego-
tiable instrument within the purview of the NIL in light of
the following: (1) at common law the creditor who received
money in payment is always protected against prior equities ;58
53. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 1.
54. United States v. Ballard, 14 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1.872) ; 36 Am. JUR. Money
§ 17 (1941).
55. Stiller v. Rogers, 159 P.2d 457 (Cal. App. 1945). Accord, Frazer v.
D'Invilliers, 2 Pa. 200, 44 Am. Dec. 190 (1846) ; 10 C.J.S. Bills d Notes § 23
(1955). The only indication to the contrary which was discovered was the case
of Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. Hamilton National Bank, 199 F.2d
127 (6th Cir. 1952). In that case, a district court had held that paper money
is not a negotiable instrument within the purview of the NIL. However, the
appeal court held that since no "value" had been given as contemplated by the
NIL, it was immaterial whether money be deemed to come within the purview
of the NIL. A vigorous dissent urged that paper money should be considered as
a negotiable instrument within the purview of the NIL.
56. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 33 (1943).
57. See UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 191; BRANNAN, NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw 599, 1341 (Beutel's 7th ed. 1948).
58. See note 18 supra.
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(2) the law merchant, and later its codification in the form of
the NIL, was designed to impart to commercial paper the same
freedom from prior equities as existed for paper money in order
that commercial paper might substitute for paper money ;59 and
(3) paper money seemingly meets all the prerequisites of a
negotiable instrument as set forth in the NIL. 0
PAPER MONEY AS NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT IN LOUISIANA
Although in the writer's opinion it seems that paper money
is counted as coming within the purview of the NIL at common
law, the fact that Louisiana has adopted the NIL does not neces-
sarily mean that paper money is to be counted as a negotiable
instrument in this state. By virtue of Article 2139, money in
Louisiana was actually made less negotiable than paper money
in the common law since the creditor, under an application of
Article 2139, is not protected from prior equities as under the
common law. Furthermore, in the recent court of appeal case
of Crawford v. Alatex Constructian Service, Inc.,6t the court
held that paper money is not to be considered a negotiable in-
strument in Louisiana, and that therefore the provisions of
Article 2139 operate to allow the original owner to recover stolen
currency from a creditor of the thief to whom it had been paid.
As pointed out in the introduction to this Comment, the court's
reasoning in support of the statement that paper money does
not come within the purview of the NIL in Louisiana is not
entirely clear. However, there is a strong inclination that the
basis for the statement was the fact that paper money is not
signed by the maker.6 2 This reasoning would not seem to be
sound, in the light of the fact that in R.S. 7:191,63 Louisiana
has adopted the provision of the NIL which states that the
59. Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452 (1758) ; BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 339-43
(1943) ; 8 AM. Jun. Bills & Notes § 619 (1937).
60. UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 1; Stiller v. Rogers, 159 P.2d
457 (Cal. App. 1945).
61. 120 So.2d 845 (La. App. 1960).
62. Id. at 852: "We do not believe currency contains all the essence of a
negotiable instrument under our law. We think United States currency is the
object for which negotiable instruments issue. The very first requirement of our
negotiable instrument law is that the instrument must be signed by the maker.
The signatures on paper money are made by facsimile stamp, put there apparently
by machinery." But see id. at 853 (on rehearing) : "We are firmly convinced that
United States currency and silver certificates are not such instruments as to
come within the purview of the Negotiable Instruments Law, possibly not for
the reason stated in our original opinion .but for the reason that such are not
commercial paper which this law was designed to cover."
63. LA. R.S. 7:191 (1950).
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terms "written" includes "printed" and "writing" includes
"print, 61 4 and in light of the seeming intention of the common
law to include paper money within the purview of the NIL.
However, even if it be conceded that the common law would
not count paper money as falling within the purview of the NIL,
the chief objection to the Crawford case is that it creates the
anomalous result in Louisiana of affording greater security to
commercial paper, which was originated to substitute for paper
money, than to money itself.
One theory which could be used to avoid such a result would
be to consider paper money as being a negotiable instrument
within the purview of the NIL at common law, and since Lou-
isiana has enacted the NIL, probably Louisiana attempted to
adopt the same negotiability to paper money as is true at com-
mon law. The adoption of this theory would mean that the
enactment of the NIL repeals Article 2139, since that article
reaches a result contrary to that proposed in the NIL. Even if it
be conceded that the legislature in adopting the NIL did not
intend that paper money should come within its purview, it is
doubtful that the intention was to create the result of affording
greater protection to commercial paper than to paper money.
Therefore, even if it be said that Article 2139 was not repealed
out of an intention on the part of the legislature to include paper
money within the purview of the NIL, nevertheless, an implied
repeal of this article would have been effected. 65
If a determination of the ownership of stolen paper money
is to be made under the NIL, the outcome would seem to be
fairly clear. Under the NIL, the term "holder in due course"
is used as an equivalent for the expression "bona fide holder
for value without notice." The holder in due course holds the
instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties, and
free from defenses available to prior parties among themselves.6
As to the question of value, the NIL, in Section 25, provides that
64. Fadaol v. Rideau, 13 La. App. 551, 128 So. 193 (1930).
65. In light of the anomalous result produced by the decision in Crawford v.
Alatex Construction Service, Inc., 120 So.2d 845 (La. App. 1960), it would seem
that it is unnecessary to consider the question of direct repeal of Article 2139.
However, it is interesting to note that Louisiana did not adopt the clause which
repeals all prior legislation in conflict therewith as was adopted by the Committee
on Uniform Laws. See La. Acts 1904, No. 64, which omitted Section 197 of the
Uniform Code.
66. LA. R.S. 7:52-57 (1950).
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"value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value."67
CONCLUSION
Although the court's interpretation of Articles 2138 and 2139
in the Crawford case would seem equitable standing alone, an
anomaly is thereby created in that paper money is made less
negotiable than commercial paper which was designed to sub-
stitute for paper money."" It is submitted that the court's failure
to consider the intent and purpose of the passage of the NIL,
in which the legislature evidenced the intent that negotiable
intruments should pass free from prior equities, was unfortunate
in light of the ever-increasing need of commerce for the exten-
sion of credit and the corresponding demand of creditors for
maximum security.6 9 It would seem that any purpose once
served by Article 2139 has been abandoned through the adoption
of the NIL. Furthermore, the solution adopted in the Crawford
case of allowing the owner to recover stolen money paid to a
creditor differs from the result under both the French and com-
mon law.
Gerald L. Walter, Jr.
67. Id. 7:25. In Exchange National Bank v. Longino, 168 La. 824, 123 So.
587 (1929), there was a note given in lieu of a past due note of an insolvent
corporation. The note held to be supported by full consideration under Section 25
of the NIL.
68. Although the applicability of Louisiana Civil Code art. 2139 to other forms
of currency is not within the scope of this Comment, it would seem that the
reasoning is similar. It is not contended that other forms of currency such as
coin is to be counted as a negotiable instrument so as to come within the purview
of the NIL but rather that the adoption of the NIL impliedly repeals Article 2139
as applied to all forms of currency.
69. For a brief criticism of the Crawford case, published after completion
of this Comment, see 2 BCI & CL Rev. 159 (1960).
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